In 2022, the International Association of Bioethics (IAB) announced that the 17th World Congress of Bioethics would be held in Doha, Qatar. In response to ethical concerns expressed about the Qatar selection, the IAB Board of Directors developed and posted to the IAB website a response using a Q&A format. In this Letter, we (the IAB President and Vice President) address concerns about the ethics of bioethics conferencing raised in a 2023 Letter to the Editor of Bioethics by Van der (...) Graaf et al. We do not represent the Board of Directors, and this Letter expresses solely our own views. (shrink)

The debate between Glymour and Fine hinges in part on a comparison of the width of the incoming wave packet in momentum space with the angles intercepted by the detectors in the Cross-Ramsey experiment. As Fine argues, it follows from the quantum formalism that the initial dispersion will be conserved in Compton scattering, and he allows that the Sum Rule is constrained by the statistical results of quantum mechanics. The Sum Rule may fail, but it will not fail in any (...) way that violates quantum mechanics. Thus most of the time the individual momentum value does not change more than the width of the initial wave packet: usually the value of Qγe at t must equal the value of Qγ at t′ plus the value of Qe at t′ ± Δp/2, where Δp represents the dispersion in momentum for the initial gamma ray. Thus in order to refute Fine's thesis, the detectors must discriminate finely enough to pick out changeovers of individual values within Δp. (shrink)

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The volume brings together for the first time original essays by leading philosophers working on powers in relation to metaphysics, philosophy of natural and social science, philosophy of mind and action, epistemology, ethics and social and political philosophy. In each area, the concern is to show how a commitment to real causal powers affects discussion at the level in question. In metaphysics, for example, realism about powers is now recognized as providing an alternative to orthodox accounts of causation, modality, properties (...) and laws. Dispositional realist philosophers of science, meanwhile, argue that a powers ontology allows for a proper account of the nature of scientific explanation. In the philosophy of mind there is the suggestion that agency is best understood in terms of the distinctive powers of human beings. Those who take virtue theoretic approaches in epistemology and ethics have long been interested in the powers that allow for knowledge and/or moral excellence. In social and political philosophy, finally, powers theorists are interested in the powers of sociological phenomena such as collectivities, institutions, roles and/or social relations, but also in the conditions of possibility for the cultivation of the powers of individuals. The book will be of interest to philosophers working in any of these areas, as well as to historians of philosophy, political theorists and critical realists. (shrink)

The volume brings together for the first time original essays by leading philosophers working on powers in relation to metaphysics, philosophy of natural and social science, philosophy of mind and action, epistemology, ethics and social and political philosophy. In each area, the concern is to show how a commitment to real causal powers affects discussion at the level in question. In metaphysics, for example, realism about powers is now recognized as providing an alternative to orthodox accounts of causation, modality, properties (...) and laws. Dispositional realist philosophers of science, meanwhile, argue that a powers ontology allows for a proper account of the nature of scientific explanation. In the philosophy of mind there is the suggestion that agency is best understood in terms of the distinctive powers of human beings. Those who take virtue theoretic approaches in epistemology and ethics have long been interested in the powers that allow for knowledge and/or moral excellence. In social and political philosophy, finally, powers theorists are interested in the powers of sociological phenomena such as collectivities, institutions, roles and/or social relations, but also in the conditions of possibility for the cultivation of the powers of individuals. The book will be of interest to philosophers working in any of these areas, as well as to historians of philosophy, political theorists and critical realists. (shrink)

Historian James H. Jones published the first edition of Bad Blood, the definitive history of the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, in 1981. Its clear-eyed examination of that research and its implications remains a bioethics classic, and the 30-year anniversary of its publication served as the impetus for the reexamination of research ethics that this symposium presents. Recent revelations about the United States Public Health Service study that infected mental patients and prisoners in Guatemala with syphilis in the late 1940s in order (...) to determine the efficacy of treatment represent only one of the many attestations to the persistence of ongoing, critical, and underaddressed issues in research ethics that Bad Blood first explored. Those issues include, but are not limited to: the complex and contested matters of the value of a given research question, the validity of the clinical trial designed to address it, and the priorities of science. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS ON VIRTUE AND THE GOODS OF FORTUNE* JOHN BOWLIN University of Tulsa Tulsa, Oklahoma I T IS NOW commonplace to say that Aristotle considers good fortune useful, if not indispensable, for the acquisition and exercise of the virtues, and for the success of virtuous choices.1 Aquinas obviously draws upon Aristotle's treatment of the virtues as he develops his own, and yet he says relatively little about fortune's influence (...) upon the life of virtue.2 This reticence is puzzling, in part because it seems reasonable to expect that Aquinas would address a matter so central to an Aristotelian account of the virtues, but also because fortune's effect upon that account is hardly benign. If the life of virtue requires good fortune, then the voluntary character of virtuous habits and actions is threatened. And for someone with Aquinas's theological commitments the threat comes packaged with additional worries, equally troubling. For it implies that Providence, which governs fortune's ways (STh I, q. 116, a. 1), acts as fortune does, offering virtue and its benefits to some, while unjustly denying them to others. These are difficulties that cannot be escaped by ignoring 'A version of this paper was presented on 7 January 1994 in Chicago at the annual meeting of the Society of Christian Ethics. I would like to thank John Carmody, Victor Preller, Jeffrey Stout, and John Taylor for their comments and criticisms. The usual disclaimers apply. 1 See, e.g., Nancy Sherman, The Fabric ofCharacter: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), chapter 2. 2 Aquinas's interpreters have tended to say even less. For this reason I develop Aquinas's account of the relation between the virtues and the goods of fortune by looking to a number of recent interpretations of Aristotle's account. 537 538 JOHN BOWLIN them, or so it would seem. We must ask, therefore, whether Aquinas fails to see the problems that fortune creates for his treatment of the virtues, or, alternatively, whether his treatment of the virtues offers reasons that warrant his silence.3 Of course, there are multiple questions here insofar as fortune's potential influence upon the life of virtue is as complex as that life. Virtues are acquired, retained, and exercised, and fortune can affect each process in different ways, just as it can affect the success of virtuous choices. Add to this the fact that different virtues are subject to fortune in different ways and to different degrees and suddenly the possibilities for inquiry are vast. Indeed, the thought of undertaking a comprehensive inquiry tempts hubris. Mine will be more modest, asking simply this: what kind and what measure of external goods, those distributed by fortune, are required in order to pursue a life of virtue? l. REJECTED OPTIONS Aquinas lists the following external goods: wealth, power, honor, fame, a good country, a good name, and perhaps a few others (STh I-II, q. 2, a. 1-4; II-II, q. 108, a. 3).4 He considers them instrumental goods, which the virtuous must possess in some measure if they hope to achieve their ends consistently (STh I-II, q. 2, a. 1; II-II, q. 83, a. 6; q. 118, a. 1). He writes, "For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in an operation of virtue" (STh I-II, q. 4, a. 7). Often their usefulness to the virtuous is direct, when, for example, they serve as a necessary instrument of a certain kind of virtuous action. The liberal, for instance, cannot successfully exercise their virtue without at least some wealth (STh II-II, q. 117, a. 3). In other contexts their usefulness is indirect, their aid to the virtuous mediated by some other condition. For instance, 3 Attending to Aquinas's silences is, of course, an effort inspired by Joseph Pieper's classic, The Silence of St. Thomas (New York: Pantheon, 1957). 4 I follow Aquinas and use "goods of fortune" and "external goods" interchangeably (STh I-II, q. 2, a. 4). AQUINAS ON... (shrink)

IN THIS PAPER I CONSIDER THE VALUE OF FRIENDSHIP FROM AN ARISTOTELIAN POINT OF VIEW. THE ISSUE IS OF CURRENT INTEREST GIVEN RECENT CHALLENGES TO IMPARTIALIST ETHICS TO TAKE MORE SERIOUSLY THE COMMITMENTS AND ATTACHMENTS OF A PERSON. HOWEVER, I ENTER THAT DEBATE IN ONLY A RESTRICTED WAY BY STRENGTHENING THE CHALLENGE ARTICULATED IN ARISTOTLE'S SYSTEMATIC DEFENSE OF FRIENDSHIP AND THE SHARED LIFE. AFTER SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS, I BEGIN BY CONSIDERING ARISTOTLE'S NOTION THAT GOOD LIVING OR HAPPINESS ("EUDAIMONIA") FOR AN (...) INDIVIDUAL NECESSARILY INCLUDES THE HAPPINESS OF OTHERS. SHARED HAPPINESS ENTAILS THE RATIONAL CAPACITY FOR JOINTLY PROMOTING COMMON ENDS AS WELL AS THE CAPACITY TO IDENTIFY WITH AND COORDINATE SEPARATE ENDS. THIS EXTENDED NOTION OF HAPPINESS PRESUPPOSES THE EXTENSION OF SELF THROUGH ATTACHMENTS, AND I NEXT CONSIDER CERTAIN MINIMAL CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR ATTACHMENT. FINALLY, I DISCUSS HOW ARISTOTLE'S NOTION OF A FRIEND AS "ANOTHER SELF" IS COMPATIBLE BOTH WITH A CONCEPTION OF THE SEPARATENESS OF THE INDIVIDUALS AND OF THE DISTINCTIVE WAYS IN WHICH EACH INDIVIDUAL REALIZES VIRTUE WITHIN A SHARED LIFE. (shrink)

Should you wash your hands? -- Are workarounds ethical? -- Turfing, bending, and gaming -- Dirty hands and the semiclear conscience -- Problems of humanity -- Ethics without heroics : foreseeing moral problems in complex systems.

This chapter gives a concrete example of a question of current scientific interest where capacities matter: ‘Do the Bell inequalities describing Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen experiments show that causality is incompatible with quantum mechanics?’ The question cannot be answered if we rely on probabilistic theories of causality and laws of associations alone. It takes the concept of capacity and related notions of how capacities operate even to formulate the problem correctly. Econometrics models with correlated errors, it is shown, can explain the EPR results (...) when the correlations are given a capacity interpretation. (shrink)

There is a takeover movement fast gaining influence in development economics, a movement that demands that predictions about development outcomes be based on randomized controlled trials. The problem it takes up—of using evidence of efficacy from good studies to predict whether a policy will be effective if we implement it—is a general one, and affects us all. My discussion is the result of a long struggle to develop the right concepts to deal with the problem of warranting effectiveness predictions. Whether (...) I have it right or not, these are questions of vast social importance that philosophers of science can, and should, help answer. (shrink)

People who lack decision‐making capacity may be able to communicate preferences, which can and should inform surrogate decision‐making on their behalf. It is unclear whether making a further distinction about “capacity for preferences,” as Jason Wasserman and Mark Navin propose in this issue of the Hastings Center Report, would improve the process of surrogate decision‐making. Anyone who is regularly involved in surrogate decision‐making or who has worked to articulate decision‐making standards and processes can think of cases in which a patient's (...) voice was ignored or his or her preferences and ability to communicate them overlooked. However, we can also think of cases in which it was unclear whether information provided by a patient, recently or in the past, should have been characterized as a preference relevant to a medical decision that the patient lacked the capacity to make. We should also recognize that clear preferences of a patient who lacks decision‐making capacity may conflict with the limits of another person or of a family's resources such that these preferences cannot guide a surrogate's decision. This patient will not get what he wants. A situation in which preferences are known and make sense but cannot be applied in a feasible way demonstrates the limits of the medical decision‐making framework concerning care that is not covered by medical insurance. (shrink)

Pluralism is usually opposed to realism. This paper argues that the two come naturally into conflict only given a third assumption-imperialism, i.e., the doctrine that some one, or some handful, of our favourite theories are universal. This paper attempts to show why that assumption is implausible, even in the case of fundamental theories in physics. It argues first that physics theories are true only in their models: for the most part the successes of a theory are confined to situations that (...) resemble the models. Second it argues specifically for the possibility of peaceful co-existence between quantum and classical physics. (shrink)

When we think about Kantian virtue, what often comes to mind is the notion of respect. Respect is due to all persons merely in virtue of their status as rational agents. Indeed, on the Kantian view, specific virtues, such as duties of beneficence, gratitude, or self-perfection, are so many ways of respecting persons as free rational agents. To preserve and promote rational agency, to protect individuals from threats against rational agency, i.e., to respect persons, is at the core of virtue. (...) No doubt, part of the appeal of the Kantian notion of respect is that it offers an intuitive way of talking about the wrongness of manipulation and coercion, and in general, the wrongness of unfairly taking advantage of another. For to respect persons is to take seriously their status as persons, and to forswear, at some level, actions and attitudes that would compromise their dignity. Talking about respect has become shorthand for signaling deontological concerns. More formally, within recent Kantian exegesis, respect is viewed as yielding a more accessible and less contrived account of the Categorical Imperative than the more traditional criterion of universalizability and the contradictions tests applied to it. Within the Kantianinspired political theory of John Rawls, respect is also a core notion, representing a pervasive good, the bases of which, just states have an obligation to distribute to their members. Yet, for all its appeal, respect is an odd feature of Kantian ethics. For it is an emotion in a theory that prides itself in grounding morality in principles of reason alone. In this essay, I draw attention to the importance of respect in Kant's account in order to show just how he makes room for the emotions. Indeed, I shall argue that on Kant's account of full moral agency, we are emotional as well as rational creatures. Although Kant often portrays respect as an abstract emotional attitude mysteriously connected to our rationality, I argue that on a suitable revision, respect can be transformed into a more concrete attitude, cultivated and expressed alongside other emotions requisite for full virtue. (shrink)

BackgroundCommunity engagement in research is valuable for instrumental and intrinsic reasons. Despite existing guidance on how to ensure meaningful CE, much of what it takes to achieve this goal differs across settings. Considering the emerging trend towards mandating CE in many research studies, this study aimed at documenting how CE is conceptualized and implemented, and then providing context-specific guidance on how researchers and research regulators in Uganda could think about and manage CE in research.MethodsWe conducted qualitative interviews and focus group (...) discussions involving forty-one respondents who were experienced in HIV/aids biomedical research involving CE. Thirty-eight of these were directly or indirectly associated with Uganda’s leading research institution in the field of HIV/aids. They included Principal Investigators, Community Liaisons Officers, Research Ethics Committee members and Community Advisory Board Members. Three respondents were from Uganda National Council for Science and Technology. Data were collected between August 2019 and August 2020, using audio-taped focus group discussions and key informant interviews, transcribed and analyzed manually to generate themes and subthemes.ResultsThree major themes emerged: goals or value of CE; the means of CE, and, the evaluation of CE. Goals or value of CE generated four subthemes representing the overarching goals of CE: Promote communities’ agency; Generate and sustain trust; Protect and promote communities’ rights and interests; and, Help studies optimize participation in the form of enrolment and retention of participants. What usually comes under the nomenclatures of methods, strategies, and approaches of CE, such as town-hall meetings, sports events, drama, and the like, should simply be understood as the means of CE, and it is not desirable to hold pre-conceived and fixed ideas about the best means to conduct CE in research since a lot depend on the context. Finally, the study found that despite CE’s critical importance, which suggests the need to track and evaluate it, CE is currently intermittently evaluated, and for inadequate motivations.ConclusionsExisting guidance on how to conduct robust CE in research is no substitute for creativity, flexibility, and reflexivity on the part of both researchers and research regulators. (shrink)

Genetic testing raises concerns that individuals will be denied health insurance (and thus, effectively, access to health care), or that employers will screen to eliminate potentially costly workers. Although we as a society do not yet concur on the degree to which private businesses have a responsibility to promote social justice, several different policy alternatives might allow us to weigh the interests of insurers, as businesses, against the interests of citizens in a responsible manner.

Knowledge of causal laws is expensive and hard to come by. But we work hard to get it because we believe that it will reduce contingency in planning policies and in building new technologies: knowledge of causal laws allows us to predict reliably what the outcomes will be when we manipulate the factors cited as causes in those laws. Or do they? This paper will argue that causal laws have no special role here. As economists from JS Mill to Robert (...) Lucas and David Hendry stress, along recently with philosophers like James Woodward and Sandra Mitchell, they can do the job only if they are invariant under the manipulations proposed. But then, I shall argue, anything that is invariant under the proposed manipulations will do this job equally well. There seems to be nothing special about causal-law knowledge in and of itself that makes it particularly valuable for policy and technology prediction. What seems to matter is invariance alone, not causality. But what guarantees invariance and how do we know when it will obtain? Here certain kinds of causal laws do have a special place – those underwritten either by what I have called ‘nomological machines’ or by what I have called ‘capacities’. Capacities and nomological machines have a double virtue that makes them invaluable for policy planning. First, the causal laws they give rise to will be invariant so long as they obtain; and second, they typically have visible markers we can come to recognize that tell us when they obtain. The markers for nomological machines are shakier than those for capacities, though, since capacities are often tied to markers by well-established empirical laws. Capacities have their own drawback however, which is the final topic of this paper: the causal laws that are guaranteed by a capacity connect the obtaining (or triggering) of a capacity with its exercise. But Hume argued (mistakenly I suggest) that no distinction can be made between the obtaining of a power and its exercise. (shrink)

Agonistic theories of democratic practice lack an explicit model for ethical cultivation. Even as these theorists advocate sensibilities of “ethical open-ness and receptivity,” so as to engage in the political work of “maintenance, repair, and amendment,” they lack an account of how individuals ought be motivated to this task or how it should unfold. Toward theorizing such a model, I turn to Freud and clinical psychoanalytic practice. I argue that Freud’s “second-education” (Nacherziehung) offers an ethical cultivation framed around a “combative (...) collaboration” between analyst and patient that teaches tolerance of discomfort; endurance of uncertainty; and narrative capacity. This second-education suggests two lessons for politics. First, that we might do well to reproduce its relational form more broadly across politics. And second, that we cultivate those “sacral spaces” capable of challenging the conditions for symbolic meaning as it stretches between personal and collective practices. (shrink)

Poverty eradication has been identified as the largest challenge facing international society in its quest for a peaceful, prosperous, and just world. Kokaz responds to this challenge by proposing a global poverty eradication principle.